

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08963 01 OF 02 151413Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----044957 151418Z /43

O 151315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4201  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION SINAI  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8963

EXDIS

BONN AND LONDON FOR S/S

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IS  
SUBJECT: PERES-WEIZMAN-DAYAN ON THE  
EVE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

1. SUMMARY: THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT GAVE NEW LIFE  
TO ISRAEL'S MODERATES AND AT LEAST MOMENTARILY IMPROVED  
THE IMAGE OF THE LABOR PARTY AS OFFERING A REAL  
ALTERNATIVE TO THE LIKUD'S FOREIGN POLICY. THE ALIGNMENT  
WAS PLEASED WITH HOW CLOSE KREISKY-BRANDT APPROACHED ITS  
PLATFORM WITH ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE RULING PARTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08963 01 OF 02 151413Z

IT DEEPENED THE SPLIT WITHIN THE LIKUD: HERUT AND  
LA'AM BITTERLY CRITICIZING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT, WHILE  
THE LIBERALS (PRIVATELY) FOUND MUCH TO LIKE IN IT.  
WEIZMAN'S TRIP TO SALZBURG, HOWEVER, SUDDENLY OVER-  
SHADOWED THE PERES-SADAT MEETING. ALTHOUGH SENDING  
WEIZMAN MUST HAVE BEEN A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR BEGIN,  
HE WAS LEFT WITH LITTLE CHOICE SINCE A REFUSAL WOULD

HAVE PLAYED DIRECTLY INTO SADAT'S HANDS. A SUCCESSFUL WEIZMAN-SADAT MEETING WOULD COMPLETELY ECLIPSE PERES' EFFORTS IN VIENNA; BUT IF WEIZMAN HAS RETURNED EMPTY-HANDED, PERES' STOCK WILL AGAIN SHOOT UP. DAYAN ALSO DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF WEIZMAN'S TALKS. HE IS FRUSTRATED AT NOT HAVING WEIZMAN'S ACCESS TO SADAT, BUT MUST INSTEAD SETTLE FOR THE POWERLESS KAMEL AND LONDON. IN THE MEANTIME, NO ONE HERE IS REALLY SURE WHAT CONSEQUENCES FLOW FROM THESE LATEST EVENTS OR WHETHER BEGIN HAS A STRATEGY TO COPE WITH SADAT'S MANIPULATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE PAST WEEK HAS WITNESSED TWO DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. AT THE MOMENT, WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON WHAT LONG-TERM EFFECTS THE SADAT MEETINGS WITH PERES AND WEIZMAN WILL HAVE ON NEGOTIATING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, THEIR IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE IS ALREADY APPARENT.

3. PERES' MEETING WITH SADAT AND THE KREISKY-BRANDT "VIENNA DECLARATION" GAVE NEW LIFE TO ISRAEL'S MODERATES JUST WHEN THEIR FORTUNES SEEMED LOWEST WITH THE PUBLICATION OF CAIRO'S SIX-POINT PROPOSAL. FOR ISRAELIS, EGYPT'S PLAN WAS THE CULMINATION OF SADAT'S "RETREAT TO INTRANSIGENCE" THAT BEGAN WITH HIS RECALL OF THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO JERUSALEM IN JANUARY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VIENNA DOCUMENT STOLE THE LIMELIGHT FROM BEGIN'S NOW CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08963 01 OF 02 151413Z

FAMILAR PEACE PLAN AND IMPROVED THE IMAGE OF THE LABOR PARTY AS OFFERING A REAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE LIKUD'S FOREIGN POLICY.

4. THE LABOR ALIGNMENT IS JUBILANT AND UNITED --EVEN RABIN IS SUPPORTING PERES--OVER WHAT IT SEES AS A BRILLIANT COUP. ITS LEADERS BELIEVE THEY HAVE PRODUCED AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS THAT IS MADE CREDIBLE BY SADAT'S ENDORSEMENT AND DONE SOMETHING TO SHIFT THE NATIONAL DEBATE FROM ABSTRACT AND IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS TO THE SECURITY ISSUE. ALTHOUGH LABOR PARTY INSIDERS KNEW THAT PERES WAS TAKING A DRAFT TO VIENNA (EBAN IS CREDITED WITH WRITING IT), THE PARTY WAS GENUINELY SURPRISED AND DELIGHTED AT HOW CLOSE THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT APPROACHED THE ALIGNMENT'S POSITIONS. ALIGNMENT LEADERS CITE THREE MAJOR POINTS OF THE DOCUMENT AS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING AND COMPATIBLE WITH THE PARTY'S POSITION: (1) IT DOES NOT EXPLICITLY SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE OR EVEN MENTION THE PLO. IN CONTRAST TO THE ASWAN FORMULA, IT DOES NOT REFER TO THE "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" OR TO THEIR "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS".

(2) IT MENTIONS WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE BORDERS "TO BE DETERMINED IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS" RATHER THAN CALLING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, AND IT REFERS TO SECURITY MEASURES OUTSIDE ISRAEL'S FINAL BOUNDARIES. (3) THE DOCUMENT EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZES THE PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

5. WHEN THE VIENNA DOCUMENT HIT THE PRESS, THE LIKUD WAS THROWN OFF BALANCE. THE ALIGNMENT'S HABITUAL ADHERENCE TO MARQUIS OF QUEENSBERRY RULES IN ITS UNACCUSTOMED ROLE OF OPPOSITION DID NOT PREPARE THE RULING PARTY FOR PERES' SUDDEN BOLD STROKE, AND SOME CONFUSION WAS EVIDENT IN ITS RANKS. THERE WAS GRUMBLING THAT BEGAN IN GIVING HIS BLESSING TO PERES' MEETING WITH SADAT, A MEETING WHICH DAYAN HAD OPPOSED. THE PERES-SADAT MEETING-  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TEL AV 08963 01 OF 02 151413Z

ING NOT ONLY PUT THE ALIGNMENT IN THE HEADLINES, IT ALSO SHIFTED THE POLITICAL MOMENTUM FROM THE LIKUD TO LABOR. TO LIKUD'S CONSTERNATION, PERES HAD COME UP WITH THE LABOR PARTY'S FIRST SOLID ACHIEVEMENT SINCE ITS DEBACLE IN LAST YEAR'S ELECTION.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VIENNA DOCUMENT SEEMS TO HAVE DEEPENED THE FISSURES WITHIN THE LIKUD ALONG FAMILIAR FAULT LINES. HERUT, LA'AM AND DAYAN REACTED WITH BITTERNESS AND CRIED FOUL. "PERES HAS NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE WITH SADAT", THEY COMPLAINED. THE LIBERALS WERE LESS VOCIFEROUS IN THEIR CONDEMNATION. WHILE OUR CONTACTS IN THAT PARTY AGREED THAT PERES HAD VIOLATED THEIR VERSION OF THE RULES, THEY SAID PRIVATELY THE VIENNA DOCUMENT IS A GOOD STATEMENT. IT ACCORDS WITH THEIR PARTY'S MORE MODERATE VIEWS ON THE WEST BANK AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS. THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT ALSO WIDENED THE YADIN-SHINUI SPLIT IN THE DMC AND (SURPRISINGLY) RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08963 02 OF 02 151429Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----045172 151433Z /43

O 151315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4202  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBSSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
MCONSUL JERUSALEM 1732  
USMISSION SINAI  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8963

EXDIS

BONN AND LONDON FOR S/S

7. IN SUM, THE VIENNA DOCUMENT RE-IGNITED NATIONAL DEBATE OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. ISRAELIS WERE QUICK TO APPRECIATE THE MEANING OF SADAT'S TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE TONE REFLECTED IN THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT. HOWEVER, TWO CONCERNS QUICKLY CAME INTO FOCUS WHICH PARTIALLY OFFSET PERES' APPARENT SUCCESS: 1) THE PERCEPTION THAT HE UNDERCUT THE GOVERNMENT BY NEGOTIATING WITH SADAT. UNITY IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL ENEMIES HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN UNQUESTIONED IMPERATIVE IN THIS SOCIETY. IT IS PART OF THE SEIGE COMPLEX AND A LEGACY OF CENTURIES OF OPPRESSION IN THE DIASPORA. AND 2) THE FEAR THAT SADAT HAD HIS CREDENTIALS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08963 02 OF 02 151429Z

AS A MODERATE ENDORSED BY PERES WITHOUT YIELDING A SINGLE POINT. ACCORDING TO THIS REASONING, SADAT WILL BE ABLE TO STICK TO HIS ROCK-HARD SIX-POINT PROPOSAL WHILE RECEIVING ALL THE PUBLIC RELATIONS BENEFITS OF SUPPORTING A MODERATE DOCUMENT LIKE KREISKY-BRANDT. ANOTHER POTENTIAL PITFALL FOR PERES IS THAT VIENNA MAY WELL STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC FEELING WHICH FIRST AROSE WITH CAIRO'S OBVIOUS FAVORITISM TOWARD WEIZMAN THAT SADAT IS MEDDLING IN ISRAELI POLITICS.

8. ON BALANCE, THE SHORT-TERM GAIN FOR PERES AND THE ALIGNMENT WAS CONSIDERABLE AND THE RISKS ACCEPTABLE. WHILE HERUT DIEHARDS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, RAGE OVER PERES' MOTIVES, MANY ISRAELIS BELIEVED

HIS EFFORTS IN VIENNA WERE CLEARLY IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS.

9. THE PUBLIC HAD NOT FINISHED DIGESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT BEFORE THE DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF WEIZMAN'S TRIP TO SALZBURG. THIS DEVELOPMENT IMMEDIATELY KNOCKED PERES AND THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT OFF THE FRONT PAGES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT PUT WEIZMAN ONCE AGAIN FOUR-SQUARE IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND ENDED THE LOW PROFILE HE HAD ASSUMED FOLLOWING HIS DEFEAT OVER THE "AMERICAN QUESTIONS". IT ALSO RESTORED THE GOVERNMENT'S PERCEIVED RELEVANCY TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER IT HAD BEEN MOMENTARILY UNDERMINED BY THE PERES-SADAT MEETING.

10. THE DECISION TO SEND WEIZMAN MUST HAVE BEEN A DIFFICULT ONE FOR BEGIN. HE COULD HARDLY RELISH THE BOOST IN PUBLIC STANDING LIKELY TO COZE TO ZUDZPPZ UVQAM A DRAMATIC MEETING WITH SADAT AND GAMASY. AND THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT DAYAN UNDERSTOOD A WEIZMAN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08963 02 OF 02 151429Z

SUCCESS IN SALZBURG WOULD INVITE INVIDIOUS COMPARISONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE IN LONDON. DAYAN WAS ALSO ANGERED BY THE PROSPECT OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER INFRINGING ON HIS POLITICAL TURF. AT LEAST TWO LIKUD MINISTERS (SHARON AND HURVITZ) REPORTEDLY OPPOSED WEIZMAN'S JOURNEY AS PLAYING INTO SADAT'S HANDS AND HELPING HIS PUBLIC IMAGE--THE SAME CRITICISM WHICH HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT PERES ONLY A DAY EARLIER. WITHIN HERUT, GAMASY'S INVITATION TO WEIZMAN WAS RESENTED AS ANOTHER INSTANCE OF SADAT'S MEDDLING IN ISRAELI POLITICS. WIEZMAN'S ACUTE AWARENESS OF RESENTMENT WITHIN HIS OWN COALITION AND OF THE SUSPICIONS RAMPANT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ACCOUNT FOR HIS EXTREME RETICENCE IN HIS PUBLIC REMARKS IN AUSTRIA AND SINCE HIS RETURN HERE. IN HIS SHOW OF DEFERRING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS AIDED BY EGYPTIAN PUBLIC REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO REPORT TO BEGIN.

11. DESPITE THESE RESERVATIONS, BEGIN PROBABLY FELF PERES' PUBLICITY TRIUMPH LEFT HIM NO CHOICE BUT TO ACQUIESE TO THE WEIZMAN TRIP. A REFUSAL WOULD HAVE PLAYED INTO SADAT'S HANDS BY REINFORCING BEFORE ISRAELIS AND THE WORLD THE PRIME MINISTER'S IMAGE OF INTRANSIGENCE. OF COURSE, THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAD SUBSTANTIVE REASONS FOR SENDING WEIZMAN TO SALZBURG. IT WANTED TO EXPLORE WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUES WITH SADAT BEFORE SEEING THE UNENTHUSIASTIC MR. KAMEL AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE. AND, IF SADAT TURNED OUT TO BE COMPROMISING ONLY IN

THE DRAWING ROOM AND NOT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THE GOI  
WILL HAVE ACQUIRED SOME AMMUNITION TO USE AGAINST CAIRO LATER.

11. THE RESULTS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S TALKS WILL  
LARGELY DETERMINE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SADAT-PERES MEETING.  
IF WEIZMAN HAS RETURNED FROM SALZBURG TRYING TO HOLD  
WATER IN HIS HANDS, THE KREISKY-BRANDT STATEMENT WILL TAKE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TEL AV 08963 02 OF 02 151429Z

ON RENEWED IMPORTANCE AND PERES WILL LIKELY REGAIN THE  
PRESTIGE HE EARNED IN HIS MEETING WITH SADAT. HOWEVER, IF  
WEIZMAN CAME BACK WITH AT LEAST THE PROMISE OF PROGRESS,  
PERES' SUDDEN SUCCESS WILL HAVE BEEN ECLIPSED FOR THE TIME BEING.

12. WHERE DO ALL THESE EVENTS LEAVE DAYAN? DEPENDING ON  
WHAT HAPPENED AT THE WEIZMAN-SADAT MEETING AND ON WHAT ULTIMATELY  
TRANSPIRES IN LONDON NEXT WEEK, DAYAN IS EITHER  
WAITING IN THE WINGS OR PLAYING SECOND FIDDLE IN THE  
ORCHESTRA PIT. DAYAN'S TURN IN THE SPOTLIGHT WILL COME  
NEXT WEEK, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT LIKE HIS SUPPORTING  
ROLE ONE BIT. HIS FRUSTRATION CENTERS ON THE FACT THAT  
HE HAS NO DIRECT CHANNEL TO SADAT. HE MUST DEAL THROUGH  
A RELATIVELY POWERLESS KAMEL, WHILE WEIZMAN NEGOTIATES  
WITH THE MORE AUTHORITATIVE GAMASY, AND EVEN DIRECTLY  
WITH SADAT. THUS, DAYAN AGAIN LAGS BEHIND WEIZMAN AND  
THAT IS NEARLY INTOLERABLE TO HIM IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLEX  
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO. WHILE THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER IS EAGER TO GET TO EL-ARISH--ON THE  
ASSUMPTION THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE WILL FOCUS PRIMARILY  
ON PROCEDURE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE--HE WILL PROBABLY  
FIND ONLY KAMEL THERE. MEANWHILE, WEIZMAN IS  
READY  
TO ACT ON HIS INVITATION FROM SADAT TO MEET SOON IN  
ALEXANDRIA.

13. WE ARE BACK ON THE ROLLER COASTER HERE, AND THE  
ISRAELIS ARE BREATHLESS WITH IT. NOBODY IS REALLY SURE  
WHAT IS HAPPENING OR WHAT CONSEQUENCES FLOW FROM THESE  
LATEST EVENTS. WE WOULD GUESS THAT INCLUDES BEGIN HIMSELF  
WHO, IN OUR JUDGMENT, IS AT BEST ONLY EVEN WITH THE GAME.  
IF HE HAS A GRAND STRATEGY TO COUNTER SADAT'S ATTEMPTS  
TO MANIPULATE THE ISRAELI POLITY, IT HAS ESCAPED US.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 TEL AV 08963 02 OF 02 151429Z

LEWIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS COMMENTS, PEACE TALKS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 15 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978TELAV08963  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780290-1253  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** TEL AVIV  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780755/aaaabulz.tel  
**Line Count:** 331  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 4d058072-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 may 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1993845  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PERES-WEIZMAN-DAYAN ON THE EVE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE  
**TAGS:** PEPR, PINT, SOPN, IS  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/4d058072-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014